North Korea Redux

A half dozen years ago, a year into Trump I, I reported in this space on a gathering in Seoul of North Korea experts and intelligence chiefs from a dozen countries. For decades, we had presumed that “if the United States and its partners could find just the right set of sanctions and enough pressure on China to enforce them, North Korea would bring its nuclear programs to the bargaining table. Again and again, that approach failed, and analysts drew two conclusions. Kim would never give up his nuclear weapons, and China would never put enough pressure on him to force him to.”[1]

By Gregory F. Treverton

Note: The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the views of SMA, Inc.

Then, in 2018, I expressed the hope that Trump might resort to the only tactic that actually had made progress with North Korea—carrots, not sticks. In 1994 carrots took the form of the Agreed Framework in which the United States agreed to build two power reactors and supply interim fuel if the North agreed to freeze its plutonium production at Yongbyon, put it under international inspection, and stop construction of two other reactors. In 2018, “with few pre-conditions, Mr. Trump gave Kim what he seems to want more than almost anything—recognition as an equal by the United States on the world stage.” Then, I hoped that Trump’s bromance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un might lead to trades of North Korean nukes for marquis ventures to lift the North out of poverty.

That was not to be. The second summit between the two men, in Hanoi in 2019, collapsed when the United States refused to agree to Pyongyang’s demand for sanctions relief and retreated to its maximalist demand: get rid of the nuclear weapons and then we can talk. For its part, the Biden administration mostly left North Korea in the “too hard” box, its hands more than full coping with wars in Ukraine and the greater Middle East. Meanwhile, North Korea has become a genuine nuclear weapons power, expanding its arsenal of missiles that perhaps could carry a nuclear warhead to the U.S. mainland and surely can put American allies and military bases in Asia at nuclear risk. It also reopened its nuclear testing site.

Politically, in early 2024, Kim announced that the North would no longer seek reunification with the South but would launch more spy satellites. He signed a mutual defense agreement with Russia, and then topped that by dispatching thousands of North Korean troops to fight with Russia in the Ukraine war.

So, what next for Trump II? North Korea didn’t figure in the presidential campaign, though Trump did tell Fox News, “when I was in there, I got along great with Kim Jong Un.”[2] Given how unpredictable both Trump and Kim are, and given the global chaos that now reigns, almost anything is possible. Still, the default answer to “what next?” is probably “not much.” Whatever Trump’s approach to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, they will dominate his agenda, whether he likes it or not. Last time around, he enjoyed the theatrics of summitry with Kim but was either uninterested or unable to engage in any serious negotiation. Again, that would be the best bet for this time around as well.

However, there are at least two wild cards. Kim’s modus operandi through the years has been to generate crises in the hope of getting international attention—and then perhaps some benefit for himself or North Korea as other nations scramble to resolve the manufactured crisis. He might resort to that tactic again, though it’s hard to imagine how he could top deploying troops on Russia’s behalf in Ukraine. A nuclear weapons test, for example?

The other wild card is even more far-fetched. That would be my hopes for the Trump-Kim relationship of six years ago. Kim is just forty years old, and no doubt hopes to rule for another forty, though as I observed then his “two favorite pastimes seem drinking and driving, so he may manage regime change on his own!” Still, it is hard to imagine that he wants forever to rule over poverty with nuclear weapons. We know by now that Trump is wildly successful as a (self) promoter of brand. Perhaps that hope of six years ago that Kim might be willing to trade some restraints on his nuclear program—notifications or limitations on missile launches for example—for brands that might enrich his poor country might tempt him. At least we might hope.

Gregory F. Treverton stepped down as Chair of the US National Intelligence Council in 2017. He is now Professor of the Practice at Dornsife College, University of Southern California, Chair of the Global TechnoPolitics Forum, and an SMA Executive Advisor.

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, quotes in the piece are from the earlier one, Gregory F. Treverton, “Learning Lessons from the North Korea Case,” July 3, 2018, available at smawins.com/news/learning-lessons-from-north-korea-case/.

[2] As quoted in Josh Smith, “Years after Historic Summits Trump Faces an Emboldened North Korea,” Reuters, November 7, 2024, available at reuters.com/world/years-after-historic-summits-trump-faces-an-emboldened-north-korea-2024-11-07/.